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Calling the Tune: Domestic Workers' Earnings
and Intra-Household Gender Relations
in Turkey
Gtil OZYEGIN

"We [women] worked but never saw the face of money." This is how
most of the rural migrant Turkish women I studied, who are employed as
domestic workers in the middle-class homes of Ankara, expressed the
absence of wages in their past lives as peasant women, when I asked them
if they earned wages back in the village. Indeed, these women were characterizing an important part of their lives as a transition from unpaid family workers to urban, "individualized" wage earners. The basic patriarchal
organization of the Turkish peasant family and its economic and social
life allow women no direct control over money when women do not receive individual wages. Although female labor is central to the production
process, this production system is characterized by the absence of
autonomous female economic activity and independent female earnings
(Sirman 1988; Berik 1987; Kandiyoti 1990). Furthermore, when women
are employed as wage laborers their wages are negotiated by and paid to
the head of the household, and, as a result, women have no control over
cash flow. Now, as wage earners, these women have become major contributors to their household economy. Does finally "seeing the face of
money" affect these women's lives in terms of greater control over resources and allow them participation in decision-making processes from
which they were previously excluded? How and in what areas of life are
women able to translate economic agency into decision-making authority?
How do women feel about earning wages? What role, if any, does earning
wages play in the alteration of their subjectivities? Does earning wages
put them in circumstances to challenge patriarchal authority?
In this paper, I investigate these questions comparatively as they pertain to the two groups of rural migrant women, who share similar migratory histories and socio economic profiles. However, their different social
locations in the urban space create differences in the dynamics involved in
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women's ability to control their income and to translate income into decision-making influence.
As many have demonstrated, women ' s earnings neither inevitably
translate into their exercise of independent control over their money, nor
automatically increase their decision-making authority in households
(Safilios-Rothschild 1990; Standing 1985 ; Blumberg 1991; Blumstein and
Schwartz 1991). There are many reasons for this. Women ' s subordinate
position in the labor market rarely allows them to achieve wage and statu
parity with men, rendering the relative size of women's monetary contribution to the household economy smaller than men ' s. Inferior earnings
provide women with low bargaining power inside the family , lending
them no special leverage in household politics of redistributive practices.
Gender and family ideologies naturalize and legitimize gendered relationships to money and authority.
In this paper, I build on these ideas of women ' s control over earned income and their spending practices in my examination of Turkish domestic
workers' experiences with their earnings. I probe two sets of interrelated
dichotomies in the literature, subsistence/surplus spending and maternal
altruism/self-interest, that inform main parameters of the discussion in
assessing women's empowerment in relation to income earning. My aim
is to posit an analysis of Turkish domestic workers' experiences that encompasses the interaction of these dichotomies.

Research Context

Turkey is a large increasingly modem and industrial nation with a population exceeding 65 million, which has undergone social transformation so
rapidly that it has been described as a society "on the brink of a social
mutation" (Tekeli 1990, 3). One aspect of change is an ongoing urbanization that is drawing the rural population into the big cities in a process one
social scientist calls "depeasantization" (Kiray 1991 ). The impact of these
social and economic transformations on women and gender relations is
not uniform in Turkey. Migration of peasant women often results in their
"housewifisation" (Senyapili 1981 b, 214). Most women, especially mar-
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ried women in rural migrant communities, are not allowed to work outside
the home because of patriarchal opposition to women's employment, and,
thus, they show the lowest urban female participation in wage labor
(Ayata and Ayata 1996). Economic hardship in many migrant households
does not erode deep-seated male objections to women' s employment.
Only 16.5 percent of the urban female population in metropolitan areas
were employed in 1994. Recent studies conducted on women's informal
occupations in urban settings suggest that the labor of migrant women is
becoming increasingly informalized (Cinar 1991; White 1991). Women
are confined to particular branches of the informal sector, concentrated in
those activities that occur within the home and are compatible with their
roles within the domestic sphere. Informal wage-earning activities reinforce women's dependent status as wives and mothers rather than as income earners.
A recent national survey of the division of labor by gender in Turkish
families reveals that housework and childcare are territories of work occupied solely by women. Women have sole responsibilty for household
tasks and childcare. The only area of work that men share with women is
grocery shopping. There is no significant difference between urban and
rural families' pattern of gendered division of labor (KSSGM 1998, 5057). The most recent findings on some aspects of decision making indicate
that routine household spending decisions are mostly made by women
(Ozbay 1990) representing a shift from the male-dominant decisionmaking profile found in the national survey of Turkish family structure in
1968 (Timur 1972). And more importantly, controlling for such factors as
social class and women's social status as employed wives or housewives,
decisions pertaining to women's physical mobility, women's employment,
birth control, and sex belonged to men indicating the pervasiveness of
male domination in Turkish society.

This Study

This paper draws upon a larger study of two groups of rural migrant
women now living in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. These rural migrant
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women work in private homes as domestic workers, where the terms and
conditions of their labor are neither officially determined nor regulated. I
distinguish the two groups of women by the proximity of their homes to
their work places. The first group of women I studied are the wives of
doorkeepers of middle and upper-middle-class apartment buildings and I
refer to this group (N=103) as wives of doorkeepers in this paper. Unlike
the majority of rural migrants, doorkeeper (kapici in Turkish - literally
means "doorkeeper") families live and work in middle and upper-class
areas where husbands are employed as doorkeepers 1 and wives as domestic workers. Doorkeeper families live in the basements of the buildings in
which their services are required. Wives of doorkeepers constitute a prime
pool from which middle-class tenants recruit waged domestic labor. Because of this, wives of doorkeepers rarely navigate the domestic labor
market, but hold a virtual monopoly over domestic service.
The second group (N=57) of domestic workers consists of those who
live in squatter settlements in the margins of the city and commute daily
to upper-middle-class neighborhoods for work. I refer to them as women
of squatter settlement in this paper. The two groups experience urban
space in quite different ways. While women of squatter settlement negotiate the diverse contexts and dynamic pace of urban life, and the domestic
labor market, wives of doorkeepers remain firmly attached to their apartment houses. Wives of doorkeepers can undertake paid domestic work
without leaving the home or the oversight of their husbands. Squatter
women, however, are accustomed to long daily commutes across subcultural and geographic boundaries Indeed, the latter embodies the constraints placed on female spatial mobility in Turkey.
The comparison between wives of doorkeepers and squatter settlement
women offers a vantage point for delineating the conditions under which
women are able to retain control over their earnings. Both groups of
women have undergone a radical transition from unpaid family laborers
The doorkeepers' main duties include operating central-heating systems, performing
maintenance duties, taking out the residents' trash, buying and distributing fresh bread
twice a day, grocery shopping for the residents, providing building security, collecting
monthly maintenance fees from tenants, and disposing of refuse from coal-burning
furnaces. Duties may also include walking tenants' dogs, tending gardens, or taking
tenants' children to school. The closest North American term for this job is "janitor" or
"super", or the "concierge" in France, though none of these fully describe the Turkish
doorkeepers' work and occupational identity. For a study of janitors in the United States during the 1950s, see Ray Gold (1952).
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(as peasant women) to individual wage earners as domestic workers. The
institution of doorkeeping perpetuates the familiar patriarchal structures,
albeit in modified forms by enabling men to maintain their traditional
control over women's labor and earnings. The imprecise boundaries between the locus of work and of home allows for the peripheral involvement of household members other than the official jobholder, the doorkeeper husband. In contrast to squatter settlement women, doorkeeper
wives retain the "unpaid family laborer" status from their rural past, despite working as wage earners. The doorkeeper's job structurally reinstates some of the terms of the peasant conjugal contract that defines men
as absolute holders and managers of the earnings of those under their authority and protection. Cash wages owed to the doorkeeper wives are occasionally paid to husbands (just as they were in the village). Thus, in
these cases, cash does not even find its way into women's hands, let alone
enter into their pockets.
With a few exceptions, the women in this study come to Ankara with
no previous urban experience. During the time of my survey in 1990, the
majority of these migrant women had lived in Ankara for a fairly long
time, roughly eleven years on average. They range in age from 18.5 to
66.0 years with a mean age of 33.2. The women in the squatter settlement
group are, on average, 6.4 years older than the wives of doorkeepers. The
mean age of marriage is 17.6 years for the doorkeeper group and 16.7 for
the squatter settlement group. Length of employment in domestic service
ranged from one month to 37.0 years with a mean of 7.7 years. Nearly
half of the women are illiterate, and only 3 percent have as much as a
middle school education. The two groups are similar in terms of number
of years in primary school and literary rate. The two groups have similar
household characteristics. Eighty-nine percent of the doorkeeper households and 81 percent of the squatter settlement households were nuclear.
Though, the doorkeeper households were smaller, with an average of 4.3
members compared with 5.3 members in squatter settlement household.
Doorkeeper families have an average of 2.6 children living at home, while
squatter families average 3 .1.
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Method

Three sources of field data: a survey, participant observation, and in-depth
interviews provide the empirical foundation of my analysis. The fact that
the majority of domestic workers in Turkey are wives of doorkeepers offered a unique opportunity for drawing a representative sample. The
apartment buildings that house this group of domestic workers and employers provided me with a frame for random sampling. I selected 103
domestic workers in the doorkeeper group by using a mixed sampling
strategy (systematic and random). In addition, I interviewed a total of 57
domestic workers from four different squatter settlement neighborhoods.
Due to the lack of an adequate sampling frame, though, a representative
sampling procedure for this group was not possible. Instead, this group
was chosen by a snowball method. The survey included forty questions
probing issues related to domestic financial arrangements, ranging from
sources of income in the household, income-pooling strategies, allocation
of income into different spending categories to patterns of money control.
In addition to these questions, the survey instrument contained questions
pertaining to spending decisions in four areas: the purchase of food, the
purchase of household durables, the purchase of electrical appliances, and
the purchase of clothes for religious holidays. It also included one question on how saved money was spent and two questions pertaining to the
raising of their children. In addition, three questions were designed to
explore decisions about both self and social life, including questions about
birth control and sex ("when to have sexual intercourse"). Finally, the
questionnaire included a question about who has the "last word" in important family matters and its normative counterpart: who should have the
word? The survey probed for open-ended responses to many questions,
including "how they define/see the impact of earning wages on their marriages".
I and my two research assistants administered the survey through faceto-face interviews. For another source of field data, I took part in many
informal gatherings of women for drinking tea and chatting. I was also
invited to circumcision and wedding ceremonies and to women's periodic
"acceptance-day" (kabul gunu) gatherings. I spent a considerable amount
of time in their homes, casually socializing, watching television and eating
meals with them, their husbands and children, and their neighbors. I became a constant presence in their communities. This status allowed for
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considerable informality: participating in daily routines without setting-up
particular meeting times and without radically interrupting the rhythm of
work or leisure. For example, I assisted women as they folded laundry,
prepared food, and bargained with the street peddlers. On a few occasions
I accompanied them on visits to a doctor's office or to stores when they
went into debt to purchase a set of steel cookware or fancy sheets. Qualitative data offers me interpretative lens for understanding the grounded
complexities of the lives of these women. Although the doorkeeper sample is based on a representative sample, the snowball sample of squatter
women limits the generalization of my findings.

Theoretical Underpinnings

In the last three decades feminist scholars have made great progress in denaturalizing a household model which had been the hallmark of a diverse
range of theories from the New Home Economics to Marxists economic
and development theories. These theories identify the household as a sharing and pooling unit without considering the relations of power that structure it. The concept of the moral economy of the household, common to
these views, assumes that the internal economy of the household is governed by principles of reciprocity, consensus, solidarity and altruism
(Wolf 1992; Folbre 1988; Berk 1985; Harris 1988 for criticism of the New
Home Economics and Marxist models). According to this model, adaptive
household strategies are "objectively" beneficial for all members of the
domestic group. This model not only ignores differences of gender and
age in family experiences, but also underestimates conflict and adversarial
negotiations concerning money or distributional practices within the
household (Dwyer and Bruce 1988; Hartmann 1981; Thorne and Yalom
1982; Harris 1988; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).
Indeed, a growing body of empirical research has shown that income
and other financial resources are not always pooled and reallocated according to the family's collective well being and resources such as food,
education and health care are distributed unequally by gender and age in
households (Dwyer and Bruce 1988; Hartmann 1981; Whitehead 1988;
Maher 1988; Hoodfar 1988; Fapohunda 1988; Mencher 1988; Charles and
Kerr 1987). There are also important differences in the ways men and
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women spend household earnings under their control. Women devote
more of their incomes than men to subsistence and nutrition, while men
withhold their earnings for individual spending (Whitehead 1988; Maher
1988; Bolak 1995; Delphy 1979; Pahl 1980; Wilson 1987; Dwyer and
Bruce 1988; Kiray 1985; Celle de Bowman 2000). White (1981) describes
women's close attachment to the collective or family aspects of consumption as reflecting "maternal altruism", a powerful ideology that effectively
creates barriers to women disposing of their income freely in the market.
Blumberg' s (1991) cross-cultural studies show that wives' incomes affect their power only to the extent that they retain control over that income. Patriarchal organization of gender relations assign women as wives
and daughters no authority in allocation and distribution of their earnings,
which are often regulated and controlled by the male head of household.
Thus, limiting the role of earned income in making differences in their
own lives. Blumberg further argues that women's empowerment is especially limited in low-income households where women, even when they
have full control over money, cannot translate their income into increased
power for themselves because subsistence incomes allow for little discretionary spending (Safilios-Rothschild 1990; Standing 1985; Blumberg
1991; Blumstein and Schwartz 1991 ).
In this chapter, I attempt to empirically probe these two dichotomies;
one that delineates sharply spending for subsistence and surplus and the
one that casts women as maternal altruists and men as self-interested and
individuated actors. Subsistence and surplus level spending are neither
empirically tangible given nor universally applicable categories. Meanings
of "subsistence" and "surplus" are not only culturally defined but also
shift depending on the income level and social class. Similarly, the dichotomy that casts women as maternal altruists and men as self-interested
and individuated actors needs to be empirically specified within the normative context of gender order in a given society. I argue that this dichotomous framework bypasses the importance of women's consumption
decisions in defining female identity. My analysis will suggest that the
boundaries between the maternal altruism and self-interest in Turkish
migrant women's lives are permeable.
In what follows I first examine allocation of women's income in the
household and distinguish the main money control patterns, discussing
women's experience in money control in relation to the levels of women's
contribution to the household economy. I then examine strategies women
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portions of their income. Here, scrutinizing the distinction between subsistence and surplus spending, I address the crucial question of what women
do with money at their disposal and suggest, as alternative to maternal
altruism and subsistence/surplus explanations, a different way of looking
at the worth of women's and men's personal spending money. Finally, I
examine women's perception of decision making according to women's
different contributor status and money control systems.

Findings and Analysis

"The Money That Comes In Daily, Goes Out Daily": Allocation of Women's Income

A pattern of gender-specific purchasing, where husband's and wife's incomes are channeled into different spending categories, characterizes
most of the households' spending practices in this study. Nearly 40 percent of the women in the doorkeeper sample reported that their earnings
go toward specific expenditures, primarily for food but also including
clothing, household durable goods, children's education, and their daughters' trousseau. In the squatter settlement group, a much higher percentage
of women (78 percent) reported that their income paid for subsistence and
nutrition, primarily for kitchen expenses.
Meanings attached to husbands' and wives' financial contributions and
the devolution of their incomes to specific expenditures are related to differences in the ways in which husbands' and wives' earnings enter the
household, reflecting differences in the frequency of payment for women
and men. In these households, women receive their wages daily, whereas
men receive their cash wages monthly. Thus, there is a built-in tendency
to spend women's wages on food and other daily expenditures and men's
wages on fixed expenditures that require monthly payments, such as installments for consumer goods and other monthly bills (rent, utilities,
phone, etc.) Many women noted that "The money that comes in daily,
goes out daily". But this expression is more readily translated into practice
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for women in the squatter settlement group who, on the way home from
work, spend a great proportion of their daily wages on food shopping.
Yet this clear-cut channeling of women's earnings into gender-specific
spending areas does not always mean that women control spending in
these areas. Even when women's earnings are earmarked for particular
kinds of expenditures, they are consolidated in a "common pot", which is
often controlled by the husband. With the exception of a small number of
cases (N=8) in the squatter settlement group where ~nly "abstract" pooling is present, as far as the members of the nuclear family are concerned,
all households in this study pool their income and other financial resources. 2 Nonetheless, the control of money, rather than the presence of
pooling, is a crucial factor that allows us to assess the relations between
power and income for women.

Women's Level of Contribution and Control of Money
In order to compare the control women have over the disposal and distribution of their incomes at different contribution levels, I subdivided the
sample into three groups according to the relative size of women's contribution to household income. Women whose contribution is equal to or
higher than 60 percent of the total household income are classified as
"major" contributors; those who contribute 40 to 60 percent are classified
as "equal"; and those who made up less than 40 percent of the total income are categorized as "minor."
In the doorkeeper group, the proportions of major, equal and minor
contributors are 44.1 percent, 38.2 percent and 17.6 percent, respectively,
2

Perhaps, as argued by Fapohunda (1988), having knowledge of a spouse's income,
knowing where that income is spent and the existence of joint financial planning are
good measures of existence of pooling. According to this criterion, households in my
study are pooling-households. First, the majority of women had full knowledge of their
husbands' income (at least the stable part of it). In cases where they did not, this was
more an effect of the unpredictability of the informal petty cash earning activities than
an instrument of intra-household power or separation of budgets. Second, they had full
knowledge of how their husbands spent their money. Third, as explained in this paragraph, they had an understanding that each spouse' s income would go to particular
items of spending and investment - regardless of who controlled the money and who
had decision-making power.
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which means that the overwhelming majority of women are the main
source of household income (Table 1). In the squatter group, 13.7 percent
of women are major contributors, 49.0 percent are equal contributors and
37.3 percent are minor contributors.
Do different proportions of male and female contributions produce differences in control and redistribution within the household? Control signifies a capacity to enforce direction and disposal of money against competing claims. Control over money is a difficult concept to measure, because
the important distinction between "execution of money" (management
and/or budgeting) and "control" often gets blurred. Pahl (1983) analytically distinguishes between "control" that concerns major intra-household
decisions of a "policy-making" kind and "management" that puts policy
decisions into action. The concept of control as I use it here covers both
the senses of "policy-making" and "management".
Table I. Women's level of contribution to the household income
Squatter

Doorkeeper

%

N

%

N
7
25

Major contributor

44.1

45

13.7

Equal contributor

38.2

39

49.0

Minor contributor
Total

17.6

18

37.3

19

100.0

102

100.0

51

%

N

%

N

61.8

63

37.3

19
19

Table 2. Control of money
Squatter

Doorkeeper
Male control
Female control

17.6

18

37.3

Shared control

20.6

21

9.8

5

15.7

8

100.0

51

Separate
Total

n.a.
100.0

102

Two items from the survey instrument produced a four-part categorization. The following have been used in assigning each woman to a specific
control category: 1) who physically holds the household money - the
wife, husband or neither (neither holds but there is a designated place
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where money is kept), and 2) who manages the household money. The
four categories developed from these two variables are "Male control",
"Female control", "Shared control", and "Separate control" (Table 2).
Under Male control system, household money is held and administered
by the husband. It basically takes two forms. In the first the husband holds
and manages the money, and the wife rarely deals with money after handing over her wages. Alternatively, the husband controls the money but
delegates the daily management of a portion of it to the wife in the form
of partial housekeeping allowance. In the majority of doorkeeper households, money is under male control (62 percent). In the squatter settlement
group, male and female control are equally distributed (37 percent). It is
only among minor contributors that I found the second variant of the
male-control system, the partial housekeeping allowance system.
If the husband's and wife's earnings are combined and she manages
the money, either held by her or kept in a place where she has exclusive
access, it is defined Female control system. This system is more prevalent
in the squatter settlement households. Shared control system presents a
pattern of joint conjugal financial control and management where the
money is either held by the woman or is kept in a designated place to
which both the husband and the wife have access. Shared control is the
second prevalent mode among the doorkeeper households (21 percent),
while its proportion is the smallest in the squatter group (10 percent).
In Separate control system each spouse holds and manages his or her
own money. Physical pooling does not take place. A gender-specific division of responsibilities for expenditures constitutes one of the bases for
the separately controlled system. While women's and men's incomes are
allocated to gender-specific expenditures across the sample as I explained
earlier, within the separate control system women and men assume control
of gender-specific spending. Each spouse keeps his/her own earnings
separately; they control and manage them separately - what Pahl (1983)
calls the "independent management system". I found this system only in
the squatter households (16 percent).
One would expect women who are major contributors to the total
household income to maintain control of financial resources. That is, major contributors would be the least represented under the male-controlled
money system. This expectation is confirmed in the case of the squatter
group in which 57 percent of households where women are major contributors are female-controlled. As the women's contribution increases,
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the proportion of squatter settlement households with money under male
control decreases and those under female control increases (Table 3).
Table 3. Level of contribution by type of control over money
Squatter Group

Doorkeeper Group
Major

Equal

Minor

Total

Major

Equal

Minor

Total

Male

64.4

53.9

72.2

61.8

14.3

32.00

52.6

37.3

Female

20.0

15.4

16.7

17.7

57.1

36.00

31.6

37.3

Shared

15.6

30.8

11.1

20.6

0.00

16.00

5.3

9.8

n.a

28.6

16.00

10.5

15.7

19

51

Separate

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Total

45

39

18

102

7

25

However, in the case of the doorkeeper group, no linear relationship is
apparent between who controls the money and the level of women's contribution. Instead, the relationship appears to be hyperbolic. While nearly
three quarters of the minor contributors are under male control, a much
smaller proportion of major or equal contributors are under male control.
Yet, the proportion of equal contributors under male control is smaller
(54 percent) than that of the major contributors (64 percent) under the
same type of control.
The overall proportion of doorkeeper households under female control
is not very large either. While 82 percent of doorkeeper wives are either
major or equal contributors, only 15 percent of these households are under
female control. Indeed, incidence of female control is relatively uniform
despite differences in contribution levels.
In the doorkeeper group, then, the type of control and the size of contribution are relatively independent factors while the two are closely correlated in the squatter group. This striking difference results from the
doorkeeper husband's job, which allows him to exert substantial control
over household money. His home-bound and shopping-centered work
informs the internal structure of the household economy, constraining
women's control over their earnings. Wives interpret their limited relationship with money in terms of a traditional conjugal contract that defines men as leaders of the household. In the modem form of this traditional idea, they believe that the husband's job places him in an
objectively privileged position to decide what is needed in the household
and how it can be obtained.
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Comparable "Worth" of Women's and Men 's Personal Spending
The degree to which women can claim any part of their earnings for themselves or for discretionary purposes varies. Three groups emerged: "nonclaimers", "known-claimers", and "clandestine claimers". Thirty percent
of the doorkeeper wives and 57 percent of the squatter women set aside
some portion of their income as money under their exclusive control. The
frequency and the amount set aside vary considerably in both groups.
Some regularly reserve a portion of their daily wages while others withhold money as they need it. About a quarter of women in the doorkeeper
group and a third in the squatter settlement group are "clandestine claimers" who set aside money without the knowledge of their husbands.
In both the doorkeeper and squatter groups, a strong relationship exists
between male control of household money and women setting aside
money for discretionary use. There is, however, a difference in the relation between control type and clandestine withholding in the two groups.
In the doorkeeper group, eight of the nine clandestine claimers are in the
"money under male control" group. In the squatter group, clandestine
claimers are evenly distributed across types of control.
Men also claim personal spending money, with nearly 20 percent of
doorkeeper husbands and 52 percent of squatter settlement men withholding some portion of their income. A larger percentage of doorkeeper husbands do not hold back money for two reasons. First, the majority of these
husbands have exclusive access to the household money. When asked
whether their husbands set aside money for their personal use, these wives
said "all money is his money". When money is under his control, the
doorkeeper, as well as the squatter settlement husband, can spend it for
personal use without designating it as "his set-aside money". The same
explanation may apply to women whose set-aside money becomes more
visible when men control all household money. Second, since the doorkeeper works inside the apartment and its vicinity, he has less workrelated expenses requiring personal spending money. In contrast, among
the squatter group, where men work away from home, a much higher proportion keep personal spending money regardless of the type of control in
the household. Both groups' percentages of set aside-money still fall below those of women's. Interestingly, the direct relationship between setting aside spending money and men's control observed among women is
more strongly mirrored among husbands. More men in the households
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where money is under female control appear to keep personal spending
money than in households where men control money themselves.
Men's personal money is spent on cigarettes, work-related expenses
(transportation) and routine socializing activities such as trips to coffee
houses, the modal "recreational" activity among lower class Turkish men.
Men's personal spending patterns cause no conflict unless they are markedly irresponsible (husbands with gambling and drinking problems.) Indeed, women believe a man should not go around without any cash in his
pocket - for, as I will discuss below, day-to-day male-gendered routines
require more visible personal cash.
Women's "personal" spending money is usually channeled into collective and non-personal expenditures. A great proportion of women spend
their discretionary funds on children's education and clothing (61 percent
in the doorkeeper and 34 percent in the squatter group). Such expenses
might include sending children to kurs (private courses outside the school
system) or to extra-curricular courses (for instance a mother from the
doorkeeper group sends her artistically gifted 11 year old daughter to an
art class) and providing children their daily allowance for school.
Many women also invest discretionary money in golden bangles and
gold coins which serve as security and savings. Although women use
golden bangles and chains as ornaments to display wealth and self-worth,
these goods also serve as savings for the well-being and security of the
family. Such jewelry is converted into money when an urgent need arises.
However, the moment of conversion occurs most typically when a big
sum of cash is needed for property investments (house and land) or when
the family marries off a son. Savings in the form of collecting gold bracelets and coins also frequently functions as an informal banking and loan
mechanism in the women's community, where women borrow and pay
back gold instead of cash. Women open credit accounts in neighborhood
stores to buy items to beautify their homes such as drapes, tablecloths,
towels, blankets, expensive steel pot sets, fancy tea pots and sets of coffee
cups to be displayed in glass cabinets. Women also spend discretionary
money on sheets, comforters and similar items as well as on material to
make embroidered household items for a daughter's trousseau.
As described thus far, these patterns of discretionary spending and
what women's income pays for are fully consistent with other cross cultural findings: women devote their income to subsistence and nutrition
and they tend to closely identify their discretionary spending interests with
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home and children (Whitehead 1988; Maher 1988; Delphy 1979; Pahl
1980; Wilson 1987; Dwyer and Bruce 1988; Kiray 1985). Should we,
then, conclude that Turkish migrant women's altruistic behavior benefits
their families and children at the expense of their own autonomy and empowerment?
I suggest that we should not automatically assume that "maternal altruism" necessarily entails negative consequences for women. We should,
instead, empirically demonstrate the actual meanings and consequences of
"maternal altruism". Accepting the proposition that women do not benefit
from their earnings because of their maternal altruism risks ignoring cultural meanings of such spending and the ways it defines identity. Even
though women in this study channel their earnings into home and children-centered spending categories, like their counterparts in similar contexts, they often cherish independent access to and control of money, even
for apparently "subsistence" level spending because their consumption
decisions enhance their status as mothers and housewives. Spending categories that are closely associated with these women's aspirations for modernity and urbanity, for example, stews - which can be made with or
without meat - are an important part of the Turkish diet. Some women
interviewed felt they had provided something out of the ordinary for their
children when they were able to add meat to such dishes. Clearly, in these
women's lives, adding meat is a "surplus" level act. These women rarely
worry about their ability to feed hungry children. Instead, they wonder if
they can bring them bananas (the most expensive fruit in Turkey), buy
their family kabob from the comer kabob shop, or serve their guests pastry from the bakery rather than homemade cookies.
The conceptual framework that proposes that women do not gain
power from discretionary spending unless, like men, they spend on themselves is workable only in circumstances where men and women participate in the same sphere of activities (especially leisure consumption). We
need to qualify such assumptions to express cultural contexts where
women's social identity depends upon their role in the family and where
there is a generalized gender segregation, such that equal gender spheres
cannot be presupposed.
What happens when the activities that women and men engage in and
the possible terrains of sociability are gender-segregated? By borrowing
the notion of "comparable worth" from the wage-equity movement
(Steinberg and Haignere 1991), we can assume a comparable worth of
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women's and men's personal expenditures even when women do not
spend their "personal money" on items and leisure activities that are
deemed to be personal. Although men and women operate within partially
divergent gender domains with distinct conceptions of value and prestige,
they may perceive themselves as gaining "comparable" degrees of status
and self-esteem from different forms of spending.
Thus, maternal altruism may be a highly feasible form of investment in
a cultural sphere with good returns of fulfillment and social recognition.
As rational and self-interested actors, these women devote their "personal" money to home and children-centered spending categories to enhance their status as wives and reputations as good mothers. Seemingly
private, altruistic spending can be experienced as enhancing the status and
self-image of the spender. To deny the benefits derived from "altruism"
spending disregards women's agency and empowerment and belies their
own perceptions of their lives and decisions.
What I am suggesting is that the "worth" of a wife's entertaining her
friends by baking chocolate cake (plain cake has a rural, unprestigious
identity), serving instant coffee (a prestige item in the Turkish context)
rather than cheaper traditional coffee, along with cubed sugar over the less
expensive loose sugar because it signifies urban, modern refinement or
sending her daughter to an art class are comparable in status value to her
husband's treating his friends with coffee in the coffee-house or smoking
high-priced imported Malboros rather than Turkish cigarettes.
Moreover, intra-gender competition is not an exclusively male phenomenon as is often assumed in the literature. Women compete among
themselves for recognition and identity within their gender sphere - and,
in financial terms, such competition can be just as costly as men's if not
more so. Women are judged, gain worth, judge themselves, and find fulfillment according to culturally established standards of womanhood.

Women's Influence in Household Decision Making

How do women perceive decision making within the household? On the
whole, doorkeeper wives seem to have a more limited influence in household spending decisions in all categories than the wives in the squatter
settlement group, a discrepancy reflecting their different positions in the
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money control systems discussed earlier. Yet their decision-making profiles are almost identical in the areas of decisions concerning self, sex, and
overall decision making.
As I described earlier, the survey instrument contained questions pertaining to decisions in four areas of spending as well as one question on
how saved money was spent. There were two questions pertaining to the
raising of their children. Three questions were designed to explore decisions about both self and social life, including questions about birth control and sex (when to have sexual intercourse). Finally, the questionnaire
included a question about who has the "last word" in important family
matters and its normative counterpart: who should have the word? For
each decision, the respondent was asked to state which of the following
choices best described the household arrangement: 1) "I have all"; 2) "I
have more than him"; 3) "Equal"; 4) "He has more than me"; and 5) "He
has all". Table 4 presents resulting total scores for the doorkeeper and
squatter groups based on a summary ratio index.3 Women in both doorkeeper and squatter households claim to have a pronounced influence on

3

In order to quantify the claimed relative weight of women's versus men 's decisions in
such matters I developed a summary ratio index. Decisions were defined as husband
dominant when respondents answered 4 or 5, female dominant when respondents answered 1 and 2, and equal when respondents answered 3. The ratio index involved the
sum of all female dominant decisions plus 1/2 of equal decisions divided by male
dominant decisions. The formula can be represented as follows:
1 + 2 + (halfof3)
Decision Influence Ratio = - - - - - - 4 + 5 + (half of 3)
The result is a ratio whose size shows the relative aggregate reported influence of the
wife over that of the husband within any specified group in the sample. A score of 1.00
indicates "equal influence"; scores less than 1.00 indicates less influence than men,
and scores over 1.00 indicate higher influence than men. Obviously, this ratio does not
lend itself to a literal, naturalistic interpretation. Instead, it should be taken as a conceptually defensible measure of women' s claimed influence in decision making. The
justification for inclusion of the reported mid-point (i.e. "equal influence") in such a
ratio is in the substantial social meaning of these women reporting an "equal influence" with their men. Since the women in my sample belong to a culture that is thoroughly patriarchal, it would be highly misleading to underestimate the weight of the
"mid-point". Reporting to have an "equal say" in certain items may signal a claim to
have very un-patriarchal powers in the family, and this measure is designed to capture
that possibility.
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purchasing and savings decisions .4 While the fact that most figures are
below 1.00, therefore indicating less influence than men, the results for
certain items in this survey are striking, for they suggest a level of
women's influence that is markedly different from conclusions reached in
other studies on decision-making profiles of Turkish families. It is also
important to emphasize that the wife ' s increased participation in decision
making is really an index of shared decision making rather than evidence
of autonomous decision making.
Women generally claim to have more influence on purchases that directly benefit them, including household technology that would reduce
their work load, than they do on purchases related to electronic gadgets, a
male domain. Women have less say in deciding how much to spend on
food than men, even though a greater proportion of women's earnings go
toward food-related expenses. This finding is not unexpected in the context of the income control patterns of these households, but it does deviate
from the more general cross-cultural pattern found in similar contexts
where women have predominant or exclusive influence. The score on this
item for the doorkeeper group is smaller than that of the squatter group,
indicating the significant role of the doorkeeper husbands as agents of
food-related purchases.
Besides purchasing decisions, women in the doorkeeper group also
have markedly less influence than men in decisions concerning expenses
associated with children's education and how to bring them up (0.67 and
0.86 respectively). A substantial difference in this area of influence between women in the doorkeeper and in the squatter households is also
evident. Squatter settlement women claim to have more influence than
their husbands in making decisions concerning children (1.08 and 1.15),
reflecting again the sharing of childcare responsibilities by the doorkeeper
husbands and the virtual absence of such involvement in the squatter
group. In both groups, husbands have considerable influence over whom
their wives may associate with. Although the score which reflects
women's influence on choice of associates is very high for both groups,
the size of the score for this item should not be considered comparable in
4

Furthermore, Elliott and Moskoff (1983) found that the responses in their sample to
similar family decision items clustered on the mid-point, decreasing the real variation
which they believe that there was. My formula, by dispersing the mid-point toward the
extremes, also takes care of this problem - albeit with a considerable fiat of mathematical aesthetics.
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size to the scores of any other decision-making items. In the doorkeeper
group, for example, 50 percent of the women report having the say on this
matter, 19 percent report having equal say with the husbands, and 31 percent report that the husband decides with whom she may associate. Corresponding percentages for the squatter group are 57.4 and 39, respectively.
The fact that husbands are involved at all (as "equal" or "more" influential) in such directly personal decisions at such high proportions is indicative of the extent of patriarchal control of women's social interactions in
these families.
Birth control is the only area of decision making in which husbands do
not have any predominant or exclusive influence. Questions pertaining to
birth control were asked only of those respondents who reported practicing birth control in response to a previous question; therefore, these
scores, apply to a subset of a sample and should be interpreted with caution. If and when a "decision" on the birth control is present, women are
the predominant decision makers in this domain (1.97 for the doorkeeper
group and 6.20 for the squatter settlement group). In the doorkeeper
group, 31 of the 46 women who use birth control (mean age 30.3) reported that it was a joint decision whereas 15 women (mean age 31.1)
stated that it was exclusively their decision. In contrast, 13 women (mean
age 35.1) out of 18 (those who use birth control) in the squatter settlement
group reported that using birth control was their own decision, and 5
women (mean age 33.4) said that this decision was made jointly with the
husband. Women seem to have less influence on the decision of when and
how frequently to have sex . The ratios are almost identical for both groups
(0.20 for the doorkeeper group and 0.16 for the squatter group) .
The ratios on "overall decision making" indicate that the last word belongs to the husband (0.13 in both groups and constitutes the lowest ratio).
This response is consistent with my analysis of men's influence on
"woman's association". This unspecific item contrasts well with a question that frames the same issue with a normative orientation, "Who do you
think should have the final say about important decisions affecting the
family?". While only 22 percent of the wives of doorkeepers and 12 percent of the women in the squatter group report having equal or more influence on important matters that affect the family, 65 percent and 55
percent of the women uphold the normative view that women ought to
have equal or more influence.
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Table 4. Women' s influence in decision making.
Doorkeeper and squatter. Totals
Doorkeeper

N*

%**

Squatter

N*

%**

0.64
0.45
0.74
1.36
0.67
0.45

81
102
102
99
76
95

79.41
100.00
100.00
97.06
74.51
93.14

0.82
0.65
0.87
1.59
1.08
0.61

30
43

58.82
84.31
86.27
86.27
50.98
88.24

0.86
1.97
1.46
0.20

96
46
102
97

94.12
45.10
100.00
95.IO

1.15
6.20
1.45
0.16

18
49
39

86.27
35.29
96.08
76.47

0.13

102

100.00

0.13

49

96.08

0.55

102

100.00

0.44

49

96.08

Consumption & saving decisions

Food
Household electronics
Household durables
Clothing
Children's education
Savings & investment

44
44

26
45

Marital & self-related decisions

How to raise children
Birth control
Woman's association
When to have sex

44

Who has the "Last Word " and Who
should have it

Who has the last word on important
family matters
Who should have the last word

* N is the number of applicable responses to the item.
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases.

Do Women's Higher Earnings Translate into Greater Power?

How do women's earnings and control of money affect decision making
for the doorkeeper and the squatter groups? As Table 5 shows, in the
doorkeeper households, a positive relationship occurs between the level of
women's contribution to the household income and their influence in decision making in the spending areas, indicating that major and equal contributors have more influence than minor contributors. Across the board,
major and equal contributors have more influence than their minor counterparts, except in the case of household electronics. The most notable
observation, however, is the existence of a small marked difference between "major" and "equal" contributors - being a major contributor does
not immediately entail having more influence than an "equal" contributor.
As shown in Table 6, in the squatter settlement households, major contributors tend to participate in purchasing decisions to a greater extent
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than minor contributors. With the exception of decisions concerning food
and savings, equal contributors have more say than minors. The difference
is especially marked in the area of self, sex, children's education, and
clothing purchases. Child raising is the only area in which there is a reverse relationship between the level of contribution and decision making.
In the doorkeeper group, control of money is closely related to decision-making power, and generally speaking, women who belong to households where money is under their control have a greater influence in all
decision-making areas than women who are in households where money
is under male control. This difference is especially pronounced in decisions concerning food and children. Parallel observations can be also
made in the case of the squatter settlement group, where a strong association exists between women's greater control of money and their greater
influence in decision making in all areas
Table 5. Women's influence in decision making by the proportion
of female monetary contribution to household in doorkeeper group
MAJOR N*
Consumption &
saving decisions
Food
Household electronics
Household durables
Clothing
Children's education
Savings & investment
Marital & self-related
decisions
How to raise children
Birth control
Woman's association
When to have sex
Who has the "Last
Word" and Who
should have it
Who has the last
word on important
family matters
Who should have it

%**

EQUAL

N*

%**

MINOR

N*

%**

0.63
0.38

31 68.89
45 100.00

0.83
0.56

33
39

84.62
100.00

0.36
0.38

17
18

94.44
100.00

0.70
1.67
0.68
0.5/

45 100.00
44 97.78
32 71.11
40 88.89

1.00
1.39
0.75
0.6/

39
37
28
37

100.00
94.87
71.79
94.87

0.44
0.80
0.52
0.13

18
18
16
18

100.00
100.00
88.89
100.00

1.15
1.94
2.00
0.28

44 97.78
25 55.56
45 100.00
41 91.11

0.75
2.09
1.36
0./6

35
17
39
39

89.74
43.59
100.00
100.00

0.55
1.67
0.80
0./3

17
4
18
17

94.44
22.22
100.00
94.44

0.15

45 100.00

0.15

39

100.00

0.06

18

100.00

0.53

45 100.00

0.63

39

100.00

0.44

18

100.00

* N is the number of applicable responses to the item.

**

PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases.
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Point of Saturation

The preceding observations suggest that women's agency as decision
makers is based on their control and disposal of their earnings. Comparing
higher contributors with minor contributors, we clearly see the influence
of earning power on decision making. However, this relationship does not
seem linear: "major" contributors (i.e. those who contribute over 60 percent of total household income) have less, not more, influence than equal
contributors (i.e. those who contribute between 40 to 60 percent of total
household income). Like those discussed earlier, this finding is consistent
with the non-linearity (curvilinear) of the relationship between contribution level and male or female control of money. Just as the size of
women's contributions does not ensure them control over money, contribution size does not automatically translate into a proportionately increased influence in household and self-related decisions. The "major"
contributors who are under either female or shared control are clearly
more influential in most decision areas than the corresponding groups
among the "equal" contributors.
The intriguing fact is that the women who make a "major" contribution
but whose money is controlled by men are worse off than the corresponding group of women who make only an "equal" contribution.
How then do we explain this predominance of male control arrangements under conditions where women are the major contributors? It is
possible to conclude that wives' earnings generate increased decisionmaking influence as long as those earnings are subordinate or equal to
husbands' eamings. 5 When women's earnings surpass those of their husbands, men appear to exercise increased control in decision making. The
threat entailed by women's economic power is countered by an increased
exercise of patriarchal prerogative.

5

This finding is consistent with Safilios-Rothchild's ( 1990) observations in the cases of
Greece, Honduras, Kenya.
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Table 6. Women's influence in decision making by the proportion
of female monetary contribution to household in squatter group
MAJOR N*

Consumption &
saving decisions
Food
Household electronics
Household durables
Clothing
Children's education
Savings & investment
Marital & self-related
decisions
How to raise children
Birth control
Woman's association
When to have sex
Who has the "Last
Word " and Who
should have it
Who has the last
word on important
family matters
Who should have it

*

**

%**

EQUAL N*

%**

MINOR

N*

%**

3.00
0.71

4
6

57.14
85.71

0.65
0.78

14
24

56.00
96.00

0.71
0.44

12
13

63 .16
68.42

1.40
1.40
2.00
1.00

6
6
6
6

85 .71
85.71
85.71
85.71

1.00
3.00
1.44
0.50

24
22
ll
21

96.00
88.00
44.00
84.00

0.56
0.78
0.50
0.64

14
16
9
18

73 .68
84.21
47.37
94.74

2.00
5.00
0.71
0.00

6
3
6
5

85.71
42.86
85.71
71.43

0.90
8.00
2.43
0.31

20
9
24
19

80.00
36.00
96.00
76.00

1.25
5.00
1.00
0.07

18
6
19
15

94.74
31.58
100.00
78 .95

0.50

6

85.71

0.07

24

96.00

0.12

19

100.00

0.40

7

100.00

0.39

23

92.00

0.52

19

100.00

N is the number of applicable responses to the item.
PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases.

Conversely, women under such conditions do not seem to seek to increase
their influence commensurately with their earnings, perhaps because continued gains involve different kinds of costs for women and result in increasing marital conflicts. Women, therefore, may be more likely to avoid
using their superior earning power as leverage for intra-household bargaining once they clearly become the dominant income providers. There
seems to be a threshold, a saturation point, beyond which women cannot or imagine they cannot - proceed.
The data clearly underscore the extent to which men reassert male control of female income once that income clearly surpasses their own. Interviews with domestic workers further illuminate women's attempts to
change the dynamics of their marriages with money and male response to
such an attempt.
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Table 7. Women' s influence in decision making by "control of money"
in doorkeeper group
Men

N*

Shared

N*

%**

0.42
0.34

47 74.60
63 100.00

2.09
0.64

17 94.44
18 100.00

0.55
0.68

17
21

80.95
100.00

0.70
1.26
0.58
0.39

63
60
49
59

100.00
95.24
77.78
93.65

0.57
1.77
0.86
0.68

18 100.00
18 100.00
13 72.22
16 88.89

1.10
1.33
0.87
0.48

21
21
14
20

100.00
100.00
66.67
95.24

0.64
1.84
1.47
0.14

60
27
63
58

95.24
42.86
100.00
92.06

1.62
3.00
2.00
0.38

17 94.44
33.33
6
18 100.00
18 100.00

1.24
1.89
I.JO
0.27

19
13
21
21

90.48
61.90
100.00
100.00

0.09

63 100.00

0.29

18 100.00

0.17

21

100.00

0.47

63 100.00

0.71

18 100.00

0.68

21

100.00

%**

Women

N*

%**

Consumption &
saving decisions

Food
Household electronics
Household durables
Clothing
Children's education
Savings & investment
Marital & self-related
decisions

How to raise children
Birth control
Woman's association
When to have sex
Who has the "Last
Word" and Who
should have it

Who has the last
word on important
family matters
Who should have it

* N is the number of applicable responses to the item.
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases.

Zebra Kibar (a pseudonym), wife of a doorkeeper, described a Sunday
afternoon when she and her husband took their two children, an 8 year old
girl and a 10 year old boy, to the amusement park (Genclik Parki). At the
beginning of this outing, the boy misbehaved - did something that made
his sister cry. The father decided to punish the boy on the spot: first he
lightly smacked him and then declared that the boy would not get the icecream he was promised and was eagerly anticipating. Zehra intervened,
turning to her husband and saying "the boy is going to get his ice-cream.
I'll pay for it. In fact, my money is paying for this whole outing". Amarital argument ensued and continued at home; the husband accused her of
using her money to undermine his authority. "Who do you think you are?"
he asked. The boy did not get his ice-cream: Zehra could not act in direct
defiance of her husband's wishes. Her defiance of his will was limited to
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the mere assertion of a disposal right. Going further than that by actually
buying the ice-cream would be costly.

Table 8. Women's influence in decision making by "control of money"
in the squatter group
Men N* %** Women N*
Consumption &
saving decisions
Food

%**

Shared N*

%**

Separate N*

%**

0.24 13 68.42
0.20 15 78.95

3.40
1.25

11
18

57.89
94.74

0.00 1
0.67 5

20.00 1.00
100.00 1.00

5
5

6 2.50
62.5 0

0.36 15 78.95

1.25

18

94.74

0.67 5

100.00 3.00

6

75.00

0.14 8 42.11
0.30 15 78.95

3.00
1.71

12
19

63.16
100.00

1.00 2
0.11 5

40.00 1.67
100.00 0.20

4
6

50.00
75 .00

0.58 15 78.95

3.00

18

94.74

1.00 5

100.00 11.00

6

75.00

0.58 15 78.95

1.77

18

94.74

1.67 4

80.00 1.33

7

87.5 0

26.32

7.00

8

20.00 7.00

4

50.00

0.89 18 94.74

1.92

19

100.00 0.75

7

87 .5 0

0.13 13 68.42

0.19

16

42.11 Women
only
100.00 Women 5
only
84.21
0.25 5

100.00 0.11

5

62.5 0

0.06 18 94.74 0.23
Who has the last
word on important
family matters
Who shou ld have it 0.50 18 94.74 0.33

19

100.00

0.00 5

l00.00 0.17

7

87 .5 0

18

94.74

0.67 5

100.00 0.45

8

100.00

Household electronics
Household durables
Clothing
Children's education
Savings & investment
Marital & selfrelated decisions

How to raise
children
Birth control
Woman's associalion
When to have sex

4.00

5

Who has the "last
Word " and Who
should have

* N is the number of applicable responses to the item.
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases.

Domestic Workers ' Earnings and Intra-Household Gender Relations 343

Table 9. Women's influence in decision making and female level
of contribution controlled by control of money in the doorkeeper group
Equal Contributors

Major Contributors
Male N* Female N*
Control
Control

Consumption &
saving decisions
Food
Household
electronics
Household
durables
Clothing
Children's
education
Savings &
investment
Marital & selfrelated decisions
How to raise
children
Birth control
Woman's association
When to have
sex
The "last word"
and who should
Who has the last
word on importan t farnil y
matters
Who should have
it
Socio demographic characteristics (Means)
Age
Age at marriage
Years worked in
domestic service
Duration in the
city

*

Shared N* Male N*
Control
Control

Female N* Shared N*
Control
Control

0.42
0.26

17
29

1.29
0.64

8
9

0.71
0.75

6
7

0.89
0.56

18
21

2.00
0.33

6
6

0.38
0.71

9
12

0.61

29

0.64

9

1.33

7

1.33

21

0.33

6

1.00

12

1.55
0.40

28
21

3.50
1.33

9
7

1.00
3.00

7
4

1.38
0.89

19
17

1.40
0.50

6
3

1.40
0.60

12
8

0.33

26

1.33

7

0.75

7

0.82

20

0.71

6

0.29

11

0.71

29

5.00

9

2.00

6

0.73

19

0.67

5

0.83

11

1.83
2.22

17
29

1.67
5.00

4
9

3.00
0.56

4
7

2.20
1.21

8
21

n.a.
1.40

2
6

1.33
1.67

7
12

0.19

25

0.64

9

0.27

7

0 .08

21

0.20

6

0.33

12

0 .07

29

0.50

9

0.17

7

0.11

21

0.20

6

0.20

12

0.49

29

0.50

9

0.75

7

0.45

21

1.40

6

0.71

12

33.3
17.7
7.0

29.0
17.0
4.1

26.9
17.l
4.5

32.4
17.9
7.9

28.0
17.5
6.8

26.8
17.4
5.2

15.6

12.0

9.7

14.6

10.5

9.4

N is the number of applicable responses to the item.

** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases.
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Table JO. Measures of the patriarchal authority and women's responses
to patriarchy in the doorkeeper group
N*

Who has the
Last Word?
PCT** who say
"Men do"

Who should have
the Last Word ?
PCT* * who say
"Men should"

Total of doorkeeper group

102

78.4

35.3

Level of monetary contribution
Major contributor
Equal contributor
Minor contributor

45
39
18

75.6
76.9
88.9

35.6
33.3
38.9

Control of money
Under male control
Under female control
Under shared control

63
18
21

85.7
61.1
71.4

42.9
27.8
19.0

* N is the number of applicable responses to the item.
** PCT is the proportion of applicable responses to the item in the total number of cases.
This cost might even mean facing physical male violence. It may explain
why women like Zehra do not attempt to exercise such disposal rights
more actively. Wife-beating is quite common in rural migrant families and
studies demonstrate a close connection between domestic violence and
money issues (Erman 1998).
But Zehra's experience is also representative of the possibilities earning and claiming money open to women's subjectivities, it testifies to the
salience of self-worth through economic agency and explains why women
in this study are markedly critical of their husband's patriarchal authority.
Only about a third of the women think that "Husbands should have the
ultimate say". Women feel that familial authority should be based on the
resources one contributes to the household rather than gender. They cannot, however, directly demand more power or authority.
When asked, "Who has the ultimate say in important family matters?"
women, departing from previous responses pertaining to specific consumption decisions, indicate that the husband has the final word. Over
three fourths of the women, regardless of their level of contribution to
household income, said that the ultimate word is their husbands'. It is
possible that women achieve "equal participation" in a range of specific
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household decisions while traditional male domination is maintained at
structural levels. The overall decision-making score is not therefore a
summary of other item-specific scores, but is instead a measure of "idealized authority" reflecting the husband's traditional institutionalized role.
These husbands' traditional authority does not derive from their roles as
providers (i.e. the resources they are capable of bringing in), but rather it
emanates from their position in the traditional patriarchal family.

Conclusion

This present study reaffirms that the relationship between women's earnings and claiming decision-making power are far from direct and simple.
Women's monetary contribution to their households is not directly correlated with independent control over money or with decision-making authority in the household. The contrast between the doorkeeper wives and
the squatter settlement women starkly demonstrates the irrelevance of the
size of women's contribution to the household budget. Due to male control of money in doorkeeper households, the wives of doorkeepers are
much higher contributors to household income than the squatter settlement women, yet they claim less influence in decision making than the
latter. This study identified a point of saturation: women's earnings enhance decision-making influence up to a point, as long as those earnings
are subordinate or equal to the husbands' earnings. When women pass this
point and begin to earn more than their husbands, husbands perceive this
as a loss of their patriarchal power and compensate by exerting control
over decision making. Decision-making profiles of the two groups of
women are almost identical in the areas concerning the self, sex, and
overall decision making and show similarities with other studies demonstrating powerfully that non-economic decisions are resistant to challenge
by women's income. Neither the size of earnings nor the control of it
translates into women's autonomy. Yet, women's earnings and controlling
money has generated a situation in which men's unquestioned authority as
husbands has become less taken-for-granted and where women have
started questioning naturalness of arbitrary male authority.
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At a theoretical level, Turkish rural migrant women's experiences reveal the limitations of dichotomous frameworks: they obscure rather than
illuminate the many ways that women embrace wage earning as the key to
successful motherhood and good reputation as housewives while they
simultaneously articulate the significance of financial independence/
autonomy within marriage for their sense of self worth and the way they
express self-confidence. Women's definition of the self through the roles
of wife and mother does not mean that they ignore the value of their labor
in monetary terms or that the ideology of family unity or identity of interests destroys their sense of individuality. As this study showed, women
have their own self-interests, often divergent from men and act on them
with their earnings. They actively manage and attempt to increase their
standing in the family and the community with their spending decisions.
Their earnings offer a capacity to participate in an increasingly pervasive
urban consumer culture and to invest into their children's education and
upward mobility. This fusion of maternal altruism and self-interest in the
definition of migrant women's identity underscores the need for conceptual frameworks that accommodate contradictions in women's lives.
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